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1. The Problem, B&T’s solution
In Barker and Taranto (2003), Taranto (2006), Barker (2008), construction It is
clear that p is analyzed (as well as its variant Clearly, p).
As an initial approximation, the construction seems to mean that p is en-
tailed by the evidence available to some relevant group, which typically includes all
the participants of the conversation. So, for example,
(1) It is clear that Abby is a doctor.
can be uttered when both the speaker and the hearer are looking at a picture of a
woman wearing a lab coat and a stethoscope.
Barker and Taranto state the following problem: if the evidence presented
to every participant of the conversation (part of the common ground) already entails
p, there is no need in stating p. The common ground, viewed as a set of possible
worlds, does not change after the assertion of clarity is made.1
The solution proposed by Barker and Taranto involves the notion of a “lin-
guistic side effect”. Every sentence is assigned some truth conditions, and the dy-
namic effect of uttering it partly consists in narrowing the common ground by ex-
cluding those possible worlds that do not meet the truth conditions (this is the “main
effect” of uttering the sentence). However, some changes to the common ground
may not be related to the outside world, but to the state of the communication it-
self.2 New discourse referents may be introduced. Standards may be set for vague
predicates. For example,
(2) Bill is tall.
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1As (Barker 2008) notes, there are cases where the set of relevant participants does not contain
both the speaker and the audience. In these circumstances the paradox does not arise. One type of
such cases are assertions of personal clarity.
2Barker and Taranto (2003), following Stalnaker, note that the conversation itself is part of the
world. For this reason, they do not consider it necessary to add information to the common ground
apart from the set of possible worlds.
Barker (2008) treats the common ground as a set of pairs 〈d,w〉, where d is a state of the conver-
sation (including standards for vague predicates), and w is a possible world. This is the formalism I
use in discussing B&T’s theory. The difference plays no role in what follows, however.
© 2008 by George Bronnikov. T. Friedman and S. Ito (eds.), SALT XVIII, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University.
may be uttered to provide information about Bill’s height (that is, for its main effect;
this would be a descriptive use of tall), but it could also be uttered in order to specify
what counts as tallness in the situation under discussion (a metalinguistic use of
tall).
Clarity assertions, according to Barker and Taranto, are always used exclu-
sively for their side effects. Namely, they set standards for what evidence is con-
sidered sufficient for belief in their argument proposition p (according to Barker
and Taranto (2003), Taranto (2006)), or what evidence is considered appropriate
justification for p (Barker 2008). That is, among the possible worlds constituting
the common ground before the utterance, those worlds are excluded where the stan-
dards of belief/justification in the current conversation are set too high.
The theory proposed by Barker and Taranto has it as its consequence that
asserting the clarity of p does not in fact entail p.
2. Problems with B&T
2.1. Factivity
There are, however, some problems with this theory. First, the prediction that
Clearly, p does not entail p is not borne out. This can be easily seen by consid-
ering cases where p turns out to be false.
Considering cases where clarity assertions stand in the present tense, B&T
can predict the infelicity of statements like
(3) #It is clear that Abby is a doctor, but in fact she is not.
The clarity assertion in the first clause ensures that the speaker believes Abby to be
a doctor. But in this case she cannot sincerely utter the second clause, on pain of
falling victim to Moore’s paradox.
However, as soon as we put the example in the past tense, those pragmatic
factors are no longer in play. Clear examples (4) pattern with simple statements of
a proposition (5), not with expressions of belief (6) or justifiability assertions (7):
(4) a. #It was clear that Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. It seemed clear that Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
(5) a. #Abby was a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. Abby seemed to be a doctor, but in fact she was not.
(6) a. We believed Abby to be a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. It seemed to us that we believed Abby to be a doctor, but in fact she was
not.
(7) a. It was justifiable to conclude that Abby is a doctor, but in fact she was not.
b. It seemed justifiable to conclude that Abby is a doctor, but in fact she was
not.
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In examples (4a) and (5a) we have a contradiction, which is absent in (6a)
and (7a). In (4b) and (5b), the second clause denies correctness of the speaker’s
opinion expressed in the first clause. In (6b) and (7b) it does not.
Barker claims that Clearly, p patterns with belief assertions (non-factive)
rather than knowledge assertions (factive), since they can be combined with might
not p claims without contradiction. My intuitions differ from his on this point.
Substituting an actual sentence for p in his examples to ease judgment, we get
(8) a. We know that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
b. We believe that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
c. It is clear that Abby is a doctor, although she might not be.
It seems to me that the only way to avoid inconsistency in (8c) is by making a pause
after the first clause:
(9) It is clear that Abby is a doctor. . . wait a minute, she might not be one, she
might be an actress.
One can repair hasty knowledge claims in a similar way. So clarity assertions pat-
tern with factive statements after all.
2.2. Repeated clarity assertions
Secondly, in the Stalnakerian framework, once the standards of justification/belief
are set, they can only get looser in the subsequent discourse (the context elements
with tighter standards have already been eliminated). Consider, however, the fol-
lowing example.
(10) A and B are sitting in an emergency room. A woman in a lab coat (X) walks
along the corridor.
A: This is clearly a doctor.
A man (Y) walks by in the opposite direction. He wears a lab coat as well.
He also has a stethoscope around his neck and carries a medical record
under his arm.
A: Clearly, this is another doctor.
Suppose we have four possible worlds:
w X and Y are both doctors.
w X is a doctor. Y is not.
w Y is a doctor. X is not.
w Neither is a doctor.
We also have three possible degrees of skepticism (these are part of the state of
conversation; we are not interested in the other parts):
d Wearing a lab coat is sufficient to be judged a doctor.
d Wearing a lab coat is not sufficient, but together with a
stethoscope and a medical record it does satisfy our doubts.
d Nothing, even the medical record, is convincing enough.
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Note that, since Y has more doctorlike features, there is no refinement of the vague
standard for justification that would make X count as a doctor, but not Y.
At the start of the conversation, every world/standards combination is pos-
sible:
S =
 〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉

After the first utterance, those world-standard pairs that don’t allow lab coat to count
as enough evidence for doctorhood are eliminated (note that the clarity assertion
does not tell us anything about the world itself):
S = {〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,〈d,w〉,}
The second clarity assertion could serve to eliminate d out of the set of possible
standards, but these world-standard pairs are already eliminated by the time it is
uttered. Thus, in Barker and Taranto’s framework, the assertion would be uninfor-
mative and therefore infelicitous. However it is perfectly normal.
2.3. No vagueness
Contrary to Barker and Taranto’s claim, clarity assertions can be used in situations
where there is no vagueness at all and the standards for belief/justification are com-
pletely determined. In particular, mathematical discourse:
(11) Take an integer n divisible by 9. Clearly, n is also divisible by 3.
To accommodate these cases, B&T would have to argue either that there are vague
standards of belief/justification involved after all (in particular, that there are context
elements where n is divisible by 9, but somehow not by 3), or that this kind of use is
special and needs separate treatment. If they choose the latter option, an explanation
would be in order, first, why the theory for mathematical (and similar) uses of clear
does not apply to the more mundane situations, and second, why the polysemy of
the Clearly, p construction is the same across a wide variety of languages.
3. Missing inference
My proposal is to take seriously the idea that the clearly construction marks the
result of an inference. Namely,
(12) It is clear to a from S that p can be analyzed as: a has performed a sound
inference which has S as premises and p as conclusion.
This is exactly what Barker (2008) calls the missing entailment theory (and dis-
misses). On my analysis, It is clear that p does entail p. By asserting clarity, the
speaker takes full responsibility for the soundness of her inference — even if the
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inference is defeasible. Thus, the behaviour of (4) is explained. In (10), the second
utterance requires a separate (although similar) inference, so it is not superfluous.
Availability of clarity assertions for mathematical statements follows triv-
ially on my account: these statements lose their special status; just like statements
about the world, they are subject to inference operations.
If the from S part of the clarity assertion is omitted, then the evidence used
as source for inference is left unspecified. In fact, when a is not the speaker, this
inference may not be available to the speaker:
(13) I see that it is clear to you that John is lying; can you explain why?
If the to a part is left out, there should be an inference available to every
participant of the conversation. Moreover, every participant should be able to make
the same inference. This can be illustrated by the following example. Suppose John
has read Crime and Punishment, Mary has read The Brothers Karamazov, and Peter
The Idiot. When they gather to exchange their opinions, according to my intuition,
it would not be appropriate for one of them to say:
(14) It is clear that Dostoevsky is a great novelist.
even though it is appropriate to utter
(15) It is clear to everyone here that Dostoevsky is a great novelist.
This kind of truth conditions requires that the speaker, in order to assert clarity of p,
both be able to draw the inference herself and be able to attribute the same inference
to the other participants. In order to attribute the inference to the other participants,
she needs to know that they possess the premises S of the inference. This, of course,
still comes short of the definition of the common ground (for example, the other
participants may not know that the speaker knows that they know S), but it becomes
rather hard to construct the tests, and when they are constructed, it is hard to elicit
clear judgments on the appropriateness of using Clearly, p in such situations. So,
for all practical purposes, my account predicts that the premises of the inference
should be in the common ground when making clarity assertions without specifying
the experiencer.
One way to capture the intuition that in a clarity assertion the speaker needs
to have a specific inference in mind is to construct information states not just for
individual agents, but for groups as well. There is a discussion in von Fintel and
Gillies (2007) of ways to aggregate information states. For their purposes, how-
ever, an aggregated state is one where all the information possessed by a group is
pooled (that would correspond to an intersection of possible world sets or to set
union of information states as sets of sentences). In order to obtain the common
ground, one would need to take into account only the information every participant
in the conversation has (thus, set union of possible world sets or set intersection of
representations).
The requirement for the inference justifying the clarity assertion to be sound
can be underscored by Gettier cases: suppose Abby is in fact a doctor, but she is
dressed in a lab coat for a Halloween party, with a toy stethoscope around her neck.
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Under this scenario, the inference “lab coat means doctorhood” is not sound, and
(1) is false.
Barker and Taranto’s question ‘why ever assert clarity?’ receives a plausible
explanation under this analysis: the speaker notifies the audience that the informa-
tion they have (S) is sufficient to infer p. Each member of the audience is invited to
build the inference for himself. The clarity statement can be used to build a greater
confidence in the audience than simply stating p: upon deriving p, the hearer does
not depend any longer on whether he trusts the speaker.
There are certain features noted by Barker and Taranto that any account of
the clearly construction should be able to explain. Three of these features fall out
immediately from my analysis. These are the inapplicability of clarity assertions to
cases of direct evidence, information already explicitly stated in the conversation,
and belief without proper justification (examples from Barker (2008)):
(16) #It is clear that Abby is wearing a stethoscope.
(17) A. Guess what? It turns out that Abby is a doctor!
B. #Now that you’ve told me this, it’s clear that Abby is a doctor.
(18) #It is clear that God exists.
In all of these cases, there is no inference that allows us to assert p; therefore, the
clearly construction is inappropriate.
4. Barker’s objections
Reasons given in Barker (2008) for rejecting the “missing entailment” theory of the
kind I am defending are the following. First, clarity assertions are often made when
the proposition in question is not in fact entailed by the evidence:
(19) It is clear that Abby is a doctor
is said when she might in fact be an actress or dressed for a Halloween party. All we
need to say is that inference, the existence of which is stated by the clarity assertion,
may be defeasible: it can involve generic statements as premises or use other types
of default rules. There will be no strict entailment in such cases.
Second, for some examples the missing entailment theory seems to predict
wrong results:
(20) A. John is a bachelor.
B. #Clearly, then, he is not married.
(21) A. John ate a sandwich and drank a glass of beer.
B. #So it is clear that John ate a sandwich.
We can note that the inferences involved in these examples are extremely
simple: subtyping in (20) and conjunction simplification in (21). So the missing
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entailment theory can be saved if we specify that the entailment in question should
be substantial enough — not limited to certain easy types of inference.
The requirement that the inference be nontrivial may stem from the fact that
people are reluctant to recognize certain simple inference steps as such.3 After all,
(22) John ate a sandwich and drank a glass of beer. ?Therefore, he ate a sandwich.
does not sound too natural either. If we do recognize absence of trivial inference as
part of the meaning of clearly, it has to be a presupposition, as demonstrated by a
negation test:
(23) A. John is a bachelor.
B. #It isn’t clear that he is not married.
(only allowable if B is disputing A’s claim).
The class of ‘trivial’ inferences may, for all I see, coincide with the class of
inferences involved in ascribing beliefs to other persons:
(24) a. Bill believes that John is a bachelor. Therefore, he believes that John is
unmarried.
b. Bill believes that n is divisible by 9. #Therefore, he believes that n is
divisible by 3.
In (24a), we have a valid inference. It is impossible for a competent speaker to
believe someone to be a bachelor without believing him to be unmarried. The
inference in (24b), on the other hand, is invalid, since humans are not logically
omniscient.
Gradability, which Barker uses as another argument against the missing en-
tailment theory, is discussed later, in section 8.
5. A formal theory
So far, all our arguments have been informal. To make them more precise, we need
a framework where one can take inference into account. Inference consists in ma-
nipulating representations, so I choose to introduce representations explicitly into
our model.4 The cognitive state of an agent a (in each possible world) will be cap-
tured by a set Sa of formulas — her explicit beliefs.5 These formulas are supposed
to be translations from some internal “language of thought”, free of indexicals. For
any formula φ of our logic language and any agent a, Baφ will be a formula which
is true just in case φ is in a’s belief set. To capture group knowledge, we may
introduce sum agents: Ba+bφ will be true iff φ is in the belief sets of both a and b.
3This explanation was suggested by Gennaro Chierchia (p. c.).
4See section 6 for a criticism of an approach which tries to deal with inference using a possible
worlds toolbox.
5Beliefs of an agent are not limited to sentences in this set. We need to account for tacit beliefs
such as There are less than 50000 people in this room.
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Epistemic accessibility relation between worlds (for an agent a) can be re-
covered by taking the intersection of propositions denoted by the sentences in a’s
belief set.
Admittedly, “sentence” is not a good term for the internal representation
of a belief. These “sentences” are more like the structured propositions of (Lewis
1970) or thoughts in (Crimmins 1992). I stick with “sentence” as a term since
“proposition” is reserved for sets of possible worlds, and talking about inferences
on ‘thoughts’ seem too unconventional.6
We can use an idea stated in Duc (2001) and employ a variant of dynamic
logic to represent inferences.7 An application of a derivation rule R by an agent a
constitutes an action; this action converts a state into one where the conclusion of
the rule is added to a’s cognitive state.8
Duc is only interested in computational complexity of derivations; thus, his
logic only has Fa as an action — that is, application of any rule. We need to talk
about derivations differing in how obvious they are; presumably, some rules are
harder to apply than the others. Therefore, we consider every rule as a separate type
of action.9
In order to provide an analysis of clarity assertions, we need to distinguish
between trivial derivations (which are too simple to trigger clarity assertions), easy
derivations (which do trigger assertions of clarity) and hard derivations (where the
existence of such a derivation does not count as clarity). A simplifying assumption
here will be that these types of derivation only differ in the types of rules employed.
(In principle, the number of steps and their order could also play a role, and such
conditions are also expressible in the language of dynamic logic.) Thus for an
agent a we will have trivial rules Aa . . .Aka, easy rules Ba . . .Bma, and hard rules
Ca . . .Cna. A trivial derivation performed by a will be an action Triva = (Aa ∪
. . .∪Aka)∗ (an action composed of any number of elementary actions, where each
elementary action is an instance of a trivial rule applied by a). An easy inference
by a is the action Easya = (Aa∪ . . .∪Aka∪Ba∪ . . .∪Bma)∗, that is, it can employ
both trivial and easy rules any number of times.
6Thoughts in the sense of Crimmins are different from structured propositions: their basic build-
ing blocks are notions and concepts, not word denotations. This setup makes it possible to deal with
failures of reference for elementary symbols of the internal “language”.
7Another related system is Logic of Proofs (see, for example, Artemov 2001).
8In Dynamic Logic, α;β denotes an action consisting of sequentially performing α , then β ;
α ∪β is non-deterministic choice between α and β ; and α∗ is action α repeated 0 or more times.
〈α〉φ is a formula saying that φ may hold after α is performed. Since we only distinguish our
elementary actions up the the rule being applied (i. e. it may be applied to the wrong premises), we
have no use for the stronger [α]φ form.
9A model like this is limited to one particular derivation system. However, systems may be
intertranslatable. Derivation patterns using one system of rules may be expressible as derivation
patterns using another system.
If we use natural deduction as our system of rules, we will need to represent subproofs as action
functions (functions taking an action and producing another). This, in turn, necessitates the use of
Context Free Dynamic Logic (Harel 1979).
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In this case, we can say that
!It is clear to a that φ" = 〈Easya〉Baφ
with the presupposition
¬〈Triva〉Baφ
For example, assume that conjunction simplification (CS) is a trivial rule,
and universal exploitation (UE) and modus ponens (MP) are easy rules.
Suppose an agent a is in the following information state:
S =
{
N mod 9= 0,
∀x(x mod 9= 0→ x mod 3= 0)
}
In this state, it will be true that Ba(N mod  = ) Since by applying rules UE and
MP, a can achieve the state
S =

N mod 9= 0,
∀x(x mod 9= 0→ x mod 3= 0),
N mod 9= 0→ N mod 3= 0,
N mod 3= 0

the following formulas will be true in S:
〈UEa;MPa〉Ba(N mod = )
〈(UEa∪MPa)∗〉Ba(N mod = )
〈Easya〉Ba(N mod = )
Since 〈Triva〉Ba(N mod = ) is false in this situation (and thus, the presupposition
for a clarity assertion is satisfied), (11) is true, according to our definition.
6. Clearly vs. epistemic must
In von Fintel and Gillies (2008), an argument similar to mine is made with respect
to the epistemic must, and a similar solution is proposed:
Epistemic modals signal that their prejacent is not directly settled by
the salient kernel (where ‘kernel’ is a set of propositions — a structure
that does not have the closure property — G. B).
However, clearly and must are not interchangeable.
• In the clearly construction, the existence of an appropriate inference is part
of the assertion. Unlike must, clearly can take narrow scope with respect to
operators like negation and tense.
(25) It is not clear to me that Abby is a doctor, but she might be.
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(26) It was clear to me yesterday already that Abby is a doctor.
(This is a property that many epistemic modals have, but by no means all of
them. For example, the English have to can be embedded under tense and
negation operators.)
• Must does not have to be based on public evidence, even when the relevant
group is not specified explicitly. In fact, there is no way to specify the relevant
group in must.
• In certain situations, an inference can be marked by must, but not by clearly:
(27) John left two hours ago. Every participant in the conversation knows
that.
a. He must be home by now.
b. ?Clearly, he is home by now.
Note, however, that once the premises of the inference are stated explicitly,
clarity assertion becomes better:
(28) John left two hours ago. It takes only half an hour to get home from
here. Clearly, he is home by now.
I can see two ways to explain this behaviour:
1. Clarity assertions require the premises of the inference to be actively
entertained by the participants of the conversation. In (27), the informa-
tion required to deduce that John must have arrived by now sits in the
background of the interlocutors’ minds. Once it is foregrounded in (28),
one can use the Clearly, p construction.
The assumption that inferences based solely on background information
do not give rise to clarity seems to be refuted, though, by the following
example:
(29) The economy is clearly in recession.
can be uttered “out of the blue”, without any preparatory foregrounding
statements.
2. In (27), the “derivation” that leads to the conclusion involves operations
that do not look very much like traditional inference steps: something
like constructing mental scales and measuring distances on those scales.
Presumably, such activity does not count as “easy” for the purposes of
clarity assertion. On the other hand, in (28), the premises are stated
linguistically, and the inference consists in a couple of standard rule
applications.
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• One can use clearly to signal an inference whose conclusion is already known
to the speaker.
(30) Mary has been out of town for three days. She has not phoned. Clearly,
I’m worried/#I must be worried.
What matters in this example is that an inference exists from public evidence
that leads to the conclusion stated in the prejacent. Even though the speaker
has more direct means of knowing the prejacent, the use of clearly is sanc-
tioned.
As for the solution proposed by von Fintel and Gillies, it involves (as has
been noted already) contexts as sets of propositions. Such a set induces a partition
on possible worlds. Proposition p is not settled by the context if there are possible
worlds belonging to the same class in the partition which don’t agree on p. Such a
construction does not distinguish between equivalent propositions, so it is easy to
construct counterexamples to the theory using standard philosophical test cases:
(31) a. This animal has a heart.
b. So, clearly, it has a kidney as well/So it must have a kidney as well.
(32) a. Triangle ABC is equilateral.
b. Clearly, it is equiangular/So it must be equiangular.
Assuming that creatures with a heart are necessarily all and only creatures with a
kidney, proposition this animal has a heart is exactly the same as proposition this
animal has a kidney. Upon uttering (31a), this proposition is settled in the context
of the conversation. (31b) (in either of its variants) should be abnormal. In fact, it
is fine.
7. Special case: Sherlock Holmes
There is one special use case of clarity assertions, which can be demonstrated by an
example, suggested by Derek Ball (p. c.). Imagine Sherlock Holmes investigating
a case together with Dr. Watson and Inspector Lestrade. After all the evidence has
been collected (and known by all participants in the conversation), Holmes points
out the murderer:
(33) It is clear that the butler did it. For the maid was out on leave on the day of
the murder, the gardener is deaf and would not hear the doorbell. . . etc. etc.
What distinguishes this kind of usage from the standard one is that the inference
that leads to the conclusion can be arbitrarily complex. After making the clarity
assertion, the speaker immediately presents the inference.
Perhaps the simplicity of inference is just a pragmatic requirement in the
standard clarity assertion cases. When the inference is not presented immediately
by the speaker, the clarity assertion seems pointless as long as the audience is not
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able to recover it: the assertion does not increase the hearer’s confidence in the
proposition stated.
8. Gradability
As emphasized by Barker (2008), clarity is gradable: we have expressions like
crystal clear, somewhat clearer etc. The theory presented in this article does not
allow us to capture this property of clarity assertions. I have to resort to an informal
description as to where the sources of gradability might be located.
There are several parameters by which inferences can be graded. Two are
the length of inference and the likelihood of discovering it. As Barker’s example:
(34) It is reasonably clear that Mars is barren of life.
shows, clarity is gradable with respect to the level of confidence that the inference
provides to its conclusion. Most inferences in everyday life employ some amount
of inductive and/or defeasible reasoning, so they don’t guarantee the truth of their
conclusion with absolute certainty. Moreover, people, with their limited reasoning
capabilities, sometimes doubt whether the derivation they have just built qualifies as
a valid (much less sound) inference. Conclusions of inferences that are really bul-
letproof can be characterized as absolutely clear, crystal clear, and inferences that
employ a lot of heuristics, generic reasoning and such can give rise to statements
about propositions that are reasonably clear or relatively clear. This analysis recov-
ers much of the intuition behind Barker’s theory. It also shows why mathematical
inferences (even very long and complicated ones) hardly ever give rise to gradable
clarity:
(35) ??It is reasonably clear that Fermat’s Last theorem holds.
When sentences like (35) are used, this happens for the last of the reasons men-
tioned: the speaker does not have complete confidence that the proof she has in
mind is correct.
The fact that clarity is gradable shows that we are unlikely to discover one
day exactly what pattern of inference can give rise to clarity assertions: this is
context dependent and vague. This vagueness can lead to side effects of the sort
described by Barker: a clarity assertion may serve to establish which inferences
count as easy. However, just like in cases with tall, such side effects do not exhaust
the meaning of the construction.
9. Final remarks
Using explicit representations of the world in the mind of an agent is a conservative
extension of the standard semantics based on possible worlds, since every such
representation uniquely determines a set of possible worlds where all its statements
are true.
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Representation of sentences in an internal language, manipulated by infer-
ence, is a philosophically plausible idea (Fodor (1975) is perhaps the most famous
exposition).
It could be, however, that semantics of natural language never refers to those
representations, just to possible world structures induced by them. The existence of
clarity assertions shows that this is not the case.
Other constructions where a theory that deals with inference explicitly may
prove useful include indirect speech, belief ascriptions and evidentials (both hearsay
and inferential).
In the case of indirect speech and hearsay evidentials, the words of the pri-
mary speaker can undergo certain operations that can be called inference, such as
dropping of arguments or adverbials:
(36) John: I sold my car to Bill yesterday.
Peter: John says that he sold his car.
In the case of belief ascriptions, certain limited inferences have to be al-
lowed to account for the so called tacit beliefs (see e. g. Konolige (1986)):
(37) John believes that there are less than 50000 people in this room.
In the case of inferential evidentials, the type of inference they allow may
be limited (inference to process from its results; generic inference).
In all these cases, the language of patterns representing shapes of deductions
is likely to be useful.
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